October 28, 2007, 9:21 am

PZN - Pzena Investment Management

We're looking at a very busy ipo calendar with 25 on the schedule the first two weeks alone. We're the best spot on the web to get a complete analysis write up on every deal pre-ipo. We've also an active forum focused on entries/exits as ipos trade throughout their first year public. We also provide pre-open indications for all nasdaq ipos, giving subscribers up to the minute open indications the day ipos debut.


PZN - Pzena Investment Management

PZN - Pzena Investment Management plans on offering 7 million shares(assuming over-allotments) at a range of $16-$18. Goldman Sachs and UBS are lead managing the deal, BofA, Fox-Pitt Kelton, JP Morgan an KBW are co-managing. Post-ipo PZN will have 65 million shares outstanding for a market cap of $1.105 billion on a pricing of $17. IPO proceeds will be used to redeem shares from non-employee insiders. Essentially think of the shares offered in this deal as being offered by insiders as PZN will retain no ipo monies.

CEO Richard S. Pzena will own 40% of PZN post-ipo and will retain full voting control post-ipo due to a separate share class.

From the prospectus:

'Founded in late 1995, Pzena Investment Management, LLC is a premier value-oriented investment management firm with a record of investment excellence and exceptional client service.'

We've seen a few investment management firms ipo this decade(notably Calamos), however I believe this is the first value-oriented firm coming public in a longtime. Most of the management firms that have accessed the public markets via ipo over the years have concentrated more on growth investing.

As of 6/30/07, PZN managed $30.6 billion in assets. Revenues are generated on advisory fees earned on assets under management. For these type firms, the level of profits and growth are directly tied to the size and growth of assets under management. PZN earns about 1/2 of 1% annually on assets under management. The goal of PZN and those of their ilk is to invest those assets in a way that will generate strong annual gains as well as attract new money inflows to their funds.

PZN invests strictly on a value oriented approach, eschewing growth metrics. They've ten distinct value oriented strategies that differ by market cap and geographic focus. As of 6/30/07 PZN managed separate accounts on behalf of over 375 institutions and high net worth individual investors and acted as sub-investment adviser for twelve SEC-registered mutual funds and ten offshore funds. PZN has seen net-inflows annually each of the past five years.

PZN's value investment philosophy can be summed up as follows:

'we seek to make investments in good businesses at low prices...we are focused on generating excess returns over the long term.'

Asset growth has been impressive. On 12/31/03, PZN managed $5.8 billion in assets. They grew to $10.7 in 2004, $16.8 in 2005, $27.3 in 2006 and $30.6 as of 6/30/07. It should be noted that the first half of 2007 saw lowest dollar amount of net inflows since 2004. Net inflows the first half of 2007 were $1.3 billion, well below the first half of 2005 and 2006.

PZN's four main investment strategies, Large Cap Value, Value Service, Global Value and Small Cap Value, have outperformed their benchmarks by 3%-5% since inception. Note that while PZN underperformed during the bull run of the late '90's, they outperformed massively in the difficult markets of 2000-2002. Since 12/31/95, PZN has easily outperformed both the S&P 500 and the Russell 1000 value index.

John Hancock Advisers - Part of PZN's rapid growth the past three years has been due to a strategy of forming strategic relationships with 'sub-advisers', essentially managing the assets of investment funds. PZN has a close relationship with John Hancock Advisers managing mutual funds for Hancock. PZN acts as the investment 'sub-adviser'(read: asset manager) for the John Hancock Classic Value Fund, the John Hancock Classic Value Fund II, the John Hancock International Classic Value Fund and the John Hancock Classic Value Mega Cap Fund. these four funds combine for approximately 1/3 of all of PZN's assets under management. For In the past 18 months 20%-25% of all PZN revenues have been directly from assets managed for John Hancock.

Note - The third quarter of 2007 was characterized by a period in which value stocks underperformed heavily, as evidenced by the huge losses sustained by quant funds heavily long value and short speculative stocks. The rough quarter for value stocks did not leave PZN unscathed. PZN's assets under management as of 9/30/07 declined $1.7 billion to $28.9 billion. PZN saw net inflows for the quarter of $0.4 billion, meaning markets losses were $2.1 billion for the quarter alone. In other words PZN lost 6.8% across the board on their investments in the third quarter of 2007 alone. Third quarter was a rough quarter for the value approach indeed.

PZN's value strategy - PZN generally invests in companies after they have experienced a shortfall in their historic earnings, due to an adverse business development, management error, accounting scandal or other disruption, and before there is clear evidence of earnings recovery or business momentum. PZN's approach seeks to capture the return that can be obtained by investing in a company before the market has a level of confidence in its ability to achieve earnings recovery. Obviously the risk here is that the trouble company is unable to manage a turnaround. PZN's portfolios are concentrated, generally with 30 to 60 holdings of companies underperforming their historical earnings. When PZN enters a troubled company, they usually enter in pretty good size due to the relatively concentrated approach. Top holdings as of 9/30/07 included Citigroup, Allstate, Freddie Mac, Wal-Mart, Alcatel-Lucent and on the international side ING and Mitsubishi.


PZN will have about $50 million in debt(minus cash on hand) on the books post-ipo. Not enough to make much of a difference with $29 billion in assets under management. Should be noted however that the debt was taken on to fund a dividend payout to insiders pre-ipo.

PZN does plan on paying dividends of $0.11 quarterly. At an annualized $0.44, PZN would be yielding 2.6% annually on a pricing of $17.

2006 - PZN had total revenues of $115 million. Again revenues are generated from advisory fees based on assets under management. Unlike the hedge fund/private equity ipos we've seen in 2007, PZN does not generate revenues based on a percentage of portfolio gains quarterly of annually. Compensation and benefits expenses were a fairly low 30%. This is well below investment banking/private equity/M&A ipos of the past few years, all with compensation expense & benefit ratios in the 50%-60% ballpark. General and administrative expenses are minimal here, just 7% of revenues. Operating margins were 62%. Plugging in full taxes, net margins were 40%. Earnings per share were $0.71. On a pricing of $17, PZN would trade 24 x's 2006 earnings.

2007 - As PZN derives revenues from total assets under management and not gains on those assets, the bad third quarter won't kill their year. That is, assuming the 3rd quarter of 2007 was an anomaly and not the beginning of a trend. PZN actually had a very solid third quarter operationally as assets under management for the quarter, while they slipped, were still near all time highs for PZN. Through 3 quarters, revenues for 2007 are on pace to be $148 million, a 29% increase over 2006. With the ipo, the compensation expense and benefits ratio will actually decrease as a chunk this expense line will be shifted to equity compensation and ipo shares. Expect this expense line to dip to 23% or so, which will boost operating margins. 2007 operating margins should increase to 70%, with 43% net margins. Earnings per share should be in the $1.00 ballpark. On a pricing of $17, PZN would trade 17 X's 2007 earnings.

Looking across the publicly traded asset managers, nearly all trade 20-25 2007 earnings, indicating a bit of a discount here with the PZN pricing range. I suspect this in part to the rough third quarter for PZN's investments. If you look at PZN's track record over the past twelve years, the odds appear in favor of the third quarter of 2007 being an anomaly and not the beginning of a trend. As long as that is the case, PZN is an easy recommend in range. One thing you do not want to see here however, is another quarter of a drop in assets under management. I applaud PZN for having the fortitude to come public in a quarter in which their investments got knocked around pretty good. If PZN is able to return to their historic levels of gains on assets under management, the pricing range here offers good value mid-term plus

October 18, 2007, 6:29 am

CML - Compellent Technologies

as always all ipo pieces on every ipo available to subscribers pre-ipo at http://www.tradingipos.com

CML - Compellent Technologies

CML - Compellent Technologies plans on offering 6.9 million shares at a range of $10-$12. Morgan Stanley is leading the deal, Needham, Piper Jaffray, RBC and Weisel co-managing. Post-ipo, CML will have 30.5 million shares outstanding for a market cap of $336 million on a pricing of $11. IPO proceeds will be used for working capital (to fund losses) and general corporate purposes.

El Dorado and Crescendo Ventures will each own 17% of CML post-ipo. El Dorado and Crescendo each made a mint back in the 1990's, being very early stage tech centric venture funds. It has been quite awhile since one of their companies has gone public I believe.

From the prospectus:

'We are a leading provider of enterprise-class network storage solutions that are highly scalable, feature rich and designed to be easy to use and cost effective.'

Storage Area Network (SAN) operation; CML has sold their SAN's to 600 enterprises worldwide. They call their SAN, 'Storage Center.' CML describes their Storage Center product as follows:

'Provides storage virtualization and speeds both common and complex storage tasks by reducing the time and effort required for many complex functions into a few simple point-and-click steps.'

Performance: CML is still losing money on the bottom line. Two things however make this an interesting little tech ipo: Recent swift revenue growth and industry acknowledgment of CML's high quality storage solutions. Rarely in the prospectus do you see a company make the sort of claim CML makes. To quote, 'We believe that Storage Center is the most comprehensive enterprise-class network storage solution available today, providing increased functionality and lower total cost of ownership when compared to traditional storage systems.'

Awards: In 2006, InfoWorld selected CML's Storage Center as "Best SAN" and Computer Reseller News selected CML as a top Storage Standout. Gartner, a third-party industry analyst, recently reported Compellent to be the fastest growing disk storage company in the world in 2006.

CML does not sell through a direct sales force, instead relying 100% on channel partners. CML also employs something they call a 'virtual manufacturing strategy' in which their hardware component suppliers ship directly to customers, merging in transit with CML's storage solutions. This helps CML cut down on inventory as supplier components are pretty much drop shipped to CML's customers at the same time as CML's storage products. CML believes relying on channel partners as well as 'virtual manufacturing' lowers their operating cost structure.

Sector - Data storage as been a growing need this entire decade as enterprises are creating vast amounts of data in need of storing. Traditional storage solutions were not developed for the continued need for updated storage. These storage systems were designed to take storage snapshots, storing all data at regular intervals. This has led to massive stored data duplication.

CML's solution: Similar to 'node storage' CML's solution is based on module 'Dynamic Block' storage architecture. A block is the lowest level of data granularity within any storage system. Dynamic Block Architecture allows CML to record and track specific information about each block of data and provides intelligence on how that block is being used. With the use of modules, CML's customers can easily add storage capacity as they go. CML's block system also allows for automatic movement of blocks of data between tiers of high cost, high performance storage and tiers of lower cost inactive storage. CML believes up to 80% of stored data falls into the 'inactive' area, allowing CML's customers to save money in storing this inactive data in a low cost way.

Virtualization: Dynamic Block Architecture enables end users to create a shared storage pool. Storage Center distributes workloads across the entire pool, automatically improving utilization of storage resources for all applications. CML believes their Storage Center product meshes well with the growing adoption of server virtualization. CML and VMware have a technology partnership. From CML's website: 'Compellent's innovative storage virtualization technology integrates with VMware to create an efficient virtualized data center. Using Compellent and VMware in unison enables customers to improve utilization and lower overall costs with flexible server.'

CML currently has eight pending patent applications in the United States, two patent applications filed pursuant to the Patent Cooperation Treaty and four pending foreign patent applications. The bulk of the pending patents relate to their Dynamic Block Architecture.

Historically CML has focused on small and medium sized business. One of their growth goals going forward is to expand their business into larger enterprises. One reason that CML has focused on smaller operations is that the SAN space is dominated by large, well established tech companies. CML's direct competition includes Dell, EMC, Hewlett-Packard, Hitachi, IBM and Network Appliance.

CML has also focused primarily on the US market. 89% of revenues through the first 6 months of 2007 were from enterprises based in the US.


$2 per share in cash, no debt.

CML began shipping product in February 2004. Since revenues have grown briskly. In 2004, CML booked a shade under $4 million in revenues, $10 million in 2005 and $23.3 million in 2006. Through the first 6 months of 2007, CML appears on pace to book $48-$50 million in full year revenues a 100%+ increase over 2006. Hefty losses have come with the swift revenue growth. CML lost $0.43 in 2006.

2007 - Revenues are on pace to hit $48-$50 million in 2007, a strong 110% improvement over 2006. Gross margins are in the 45%-50% range. CML is such a young company it is not at all surprising that operating expenses here have been hefty in relation to revenues. Operating expense ratio in 2005 was 133%, 76% in 2006 and 68% through the first 6 months of 2007. The good news is that operating expenses are moving in the right direction, growing at a slower pace than revenues. They're still quite robust however, meaning CML is not closing in on break-even just yet. It should be noted that in the 6/07 quarter, CML did have by far both their strongest revenue quarter in operating history and lowest operating expense ratio. Assuming each trend continues the back half of the year, I'd expect CML to hit 62% operating expense ratio for the full year 2007. Losses for 2007 on $49-$50 million in revenues should be approximately $0.20 - $0.25.

2008 - With a company this young growing revenues this swiftly, we'll need to see the last two quarters of 2007 before predicting 2007. Assuming strong growth continues, CML should be shifting towards operational break-even sometime the back half of 2008.

Positives here are pretty clear: Swift 'hockey stick' type revenue growth from recent start up stage, industry awards, and a technology partnership with hyperbolic tech growth company VMware. Really that is enough to recommend CML in range. There are numerous risks here going forward that need to be mentioned. CML is coming public a bit too prematurely in their revenue and profit curve. This greatly heightens the risks going forward. As CML relies on one product (Storage Center) for the bulk of their revenues, any end market hiccup in quarterly demand/revenues would lead to a rather significant drop in share price. This is a very difficult and competitive sector filled with large players more than willing to cut margins to increase their market share and drive smaller companies such as CML out of the game. One need only to look at recent storage ipo ISLN for an example of what can go wrong with these type of young fast growing ipos; it is the pace of that growth stalls. In addition CML has never booked a quarterly profit and losses should continue annually for full year 2008. All this means one does not pay up heavily for this ipo. However, with an initial market cap in range of $350m or so, CML is worth the risk here. Personally I'd be far more comfortable if CML had one more year of revenue growth while shifting closer to break-even before accessing the public markets.

Recommend in range due to swift growth from recent start-up stage, industry awards/recognition and the technology partnership with VMware.

October 5, 2007, 6:27 pm

DUF - Duff & Phelps

disclosure - as of date of blog post(10/05/07), tradingipos.com does have a position in DUF.

going on 2 1/2 years now, as always all ipo analysis pieces are available to subscribers pre-ipo.


DUF - Duff & Phelps

DUF - Duff & Phelps plans on offering 9.5 million shares (assuming over-allotments) at a range of $16.50-$18.50. Goldman Sachs and UBS are lead managing the deal. Lehman, William Blair, KBW, and fox-Pitt Kelton will be co-managing. Post-ipo DUF will have 33.8 million shares outstanding for a market cap of $592 million on a $17.50 pricing. Approximately 20% of the ipo proceeds will be used to repay debt, the remainder will go to insiders.

Vestar Capital will own 20% of DUF post-ipo, Lovell Minnick 16%. Both are private equity entities that came on board DUF to help fund the 2005 purchase of Corporate Value Consulting from Standard & Poors. In addition on 9/1/07, Shinsei Bank (Japanese) purchased a 10% post-ipo stake in DUF at $16.07 per share.

From the prospectus:

'We are a leading provider of independent financial advisory and investment banking services. Our mission is to help our clients protect, maximize and recover value. The foundation of our services is our ability to provide independent advice on issues involving highly technical and complex assessments of value.'

DUF's valuation advisory services are focused on four core areas: 1)financial and tax valuation; 2)mergers & acquisitions; 3)restructuring; and 4) litigation & dispute.

We've seen a number of financial advisory and/or investment banks come public the past few years. DUF is a bit of a different animal than the rest as they focus on the unique niche of valuation advisory services specializing in complex financial, accounting, tax, regulatory and legal issues.

DUF breaks down their business into Financial Advisory and Investment Banking segments. Financial Advisory segment provides valuation advisory, corporate finance consulting, specialty tax and dispute and legal management consulting services. Investment Banking Segment provides M&A advisory services, transaction opinions and restructuring advisory services.

This is a good spot to make an important point. With the slowdown in M&A activities over the past two months, this might not be an ideal time for a financial operation with an Investment Banking M&A component to come public. DUF however derives 75%-80% of annual revenues from their Financial Advisory segment (valuation advice) and 20%-25% from their Investment Banking segment. It should be noted that a chunk of those Financial Advisory segment revenues have come from valuation advisory services for newly acquired/merged operations. DUF believes the past 18 months that 45%-50% of their overall revenues were in some aspect related to M&A. This alone should be enough to proceed with a bit of caution on this DUF ipo.

DUF does not fall neatly into either of the financial advisory/IB ipos of the past two years in that they do not rely primarily on either direct M&A advisory services nor capital raising (IPO/secondary) activities.

DUF (with 21 offices, 6 being international) had approximately 400 clients in 2006. 36% of the S&P were a client sometime over the past 18 months and during that period 60%+ of revenues were derived from repeat customers. DUF is the industry's leading independent practice providing purchase price allocation services. Additionally, DUF is the number two independent provider of fairness opinions and a top ten global provider of restructuring services based on number of assignments.

Growth Drivers:

Sarbanes Oxley - In 2002 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, among other things, has conflict of interest restraints preventing accounting firms from providing other non-audit advice. The Enron scandal was the primary driver behind this aspect of Sarbanes-Oxley. This has led to an increase in demand for independent non-audit accounting related services. DUF believes that Sarbanes-Oxley gives them a competitive advantage over the auditing focused accounting firms in securing valuation advisory clients as DUF has no audit related segment and thus no potential conflicts of interest that would run up against the constraints of Sarbanes-Oxley.

Fair Value Accounting - DUF believes they benefit from the shift towards Fair Value Accounting (FVA). FVA seeks to measure the current market value of a company's assets and liabilities as an alternative to the traditional historical cost method of accounting. Simplified for our purposes, FVA is an accounting snapshot of a company as it looks on current assessment of value, not historical. As DUF specializes in valuation, this shift to FVA standards and away from historical accounting standards plays into their favor.

Global M&A boom - This is the big question mark with this ipo. While DUF's direct M&A advisory arm is small when compared to their Financial Advisory segment, a huge chunk of their organic growth the past few years has been from giving financial advisory valuation services to newly acquired and merged companies. As M&A activity, particularly levered buyout M&A activity has slowed significantly the past few months, it remains to be seen what sort of impact this slowdown will have on DUF's advisory services. I would think the third quarter of 2007 will see a rather significant slowdown in DUF's direct and indirect M&A related revenues. Whether M&A activity resumes strength over the next twelve months will go a long way in determining the success of this DUF ipo.

Restructuring - On the flip side, if the economy slows DUF hopes that their restructuring and financial distress advisory services will grow in demand. I do like that DUF is playing both sides of the fence here with merger financial valuation advisory services as well as bankruptcy valuation services. On some level, valuation experts will be in demand no matter the economic climate.

Note - In the prospectus DUF stresses quite a bit on their non M&A related strengths. They do have that, however the transaction boom the past few years has been very good to DUF. It stands to reason that if the number of transactions in the global marketplace slow from 2006 and first half 2007 levels, DUF's revenue stream would be impacted on some level.


DUF will have approximately $1 per share in cash and debt each on the books post-ipo.

Compensation expense ratio - DUF is a people expertise operation, quite similar in this fashion to investment banking/M&A ipos such as EVR/GHL/TWPG etc...As such, compensation expenses are by far the highest expense line item. DUF's historical compensation expenses are a bit more difficult to decipher than most as they've made a few acquisitions over the past few years, most significantly being the private equity backed Corporate Value Consulting acquisition in 2005. These acquisitions have led to significantly deferred equity compensation expenses which have shown up in 2006 and 2007 (and will again for the final time in 2008). Folding out these acquisition related awards, DUF's compensation expense ratio is in line with other 'people expertise' operations at 50%.

*Note* - DUF does not fold out these acquisition related expenses in the prospectus, so the numbers below will look different than those in the prospectus. I feel the numbers below are more representative of the overall operation in 2006 and first half of 2007.

Much of DUF's revenue growth has been fueled by their own acquisitions and related M&A advisory services.

2006 - Revenues were $278 million. Compensation expense ratio was 50%. Operating margins were 11%, net margins 6%. Earnings per share were $0.50.

2007 - without seeing the impact of 3rd quarter M&A slowdown on results, I'm not going to try and forecast the full year here. This is one of those ipos that is coming right in the middle of a whole lot of confusion in their core growth driver niche and frankly I don't know how significant the M&A slowdown in the third quarter of 2007 will be on DUF. Instead let us take a look at the first half of 2007 and go from there. Revenues for the first half of 2007 were a very strong $171 million. DUF at the halfway point was on pace to blow away 2006 revenue numbers. Compensation expense ratio was 52%. Operating margins were 14%, net margins 8%. Earnings per share for the first half of 2007 were $0.42.

One would have to surmise that DUF's third quarter of 2007 will be stagnant at best, most likely a bit weaker than the first half of 2007. If we are a bit conservative on the back half of 2007, DUF earnings per share range should be $0.70 - $0.75 for the full year. On a pricing of $18.50, DUF would be trading 25 X's 2007 earnings. Again keep in mind due to the acquisition related deferred compensation expenses, GAAP earnings will be much smaller than this number. This number however is a truer indication of their current business.

Conclusion - This is a tough one. DUF had a very solid first half of 2007 fueled by prior acquisitions and a strong M&A environment. DUF is a niche leader in valuation advisory, a nice growing segment whose growth is not entirely fueled by M&A. I really would like to see DUF's third quarter earnings report. I think the abrupt global M&A slowdown in July had to have impacted DUF in some fashion. I like expertise related niche leaders however I would be very careful adding DUF on an aggressive open pending the third quarter earnings release. . M&A activity in the first half of 2007 was about as strong as it has ever been. That pace has slowed considerable thus far in the 2nd half of 2007. DUF's niche leadership is enough to recommend in range, however I'm not interested here on an aggressive opening until I see the third quarter earnings report.

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